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Abstract  We study incentives  to vertically integrate in an industry  with verti- 
cally differentiated downstream firms. Vertical  integration by one of the firms 
increases  production costs for the rival. Increased production costs negatively 
affects  quality  investment both  by the  integrated firm and  the  unintegrated 
rival.  Quality  investment by both  firms  decreases under  any  (vertical  inte- 
gration) scenario.  The decrease in quality invesment by both firms softens 
competition among downstream firms. By integrating first, a firm always 
produces the  high quality  good  and  earns  higher  profits.  A  fully integrated 
industry,  with  increased product differentiation, is observed in equilibrium. 
Due  to increase  in firm profits,  social welfare  under  this structure is greater 
than under  no integration. 
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